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Abstract: The present paper aims to analyze ECHR jurisprudence on the provisions regarding technical 
supervision at European level. The focus of the research is on the conditions of authorization and the 
legislative demands derived from the European Court of Justice’s judgments, which has repeatedly 
condemned the practices of the judicial authorities in the Member States regarding the performance of 
the technical supervision, and especially the ways of using the evidence thus obtained. Undoubtedly, 
technical surveillance is an interference in the exercise of the right to privacy of any European citizen, 
interference which is conditioned by the existence of a superior interest, namely the public interest in 
bringing to justice the persons guilty of committing various offenses. However, the ECHR consistent 
jurisprudence has shown that this public interest must not lead to the misuse of certain procedural 
measures, ignoring the right to a fair trial. The academic and practical interest of this work lies in the 
fact that its addressability is as wide as the entire European Union. Thus, the present study can support 
practitioners of law in any EU Member State, all the more so as national criminal law or criminal law 
systems tend towards a homogeneous legal provision. 
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Manner of Administration of Evidence in the Light of European Court 
of Human Rights 
No provision of the European Convention on Human Rights regulates the regime of 
evidence, this being a matter for regulating for the national laws. The role of the 
European Court is not to determine “the admissibility of certain types of evidence, 
but to examine whether the procedure, including how the evidence was obtained or 
administered, was fair in its entirety” (Volonciu & Barbu, 2007). 
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Analyzing the case-law of the Strasbourg court, we noted that the Court tends to 
consider that the violation of a Convention right - in order to obtain evidences - does 
not per se imply an infringement of the right to a fair trial. 
The analysis of the legality of evidence cannot be the responsibility of the Court, 
since it is within the margin of appreciation of the Member States. However, when 
the administration of evidence obtained in violation of a Convention law also 
infringes Art. 6, the Court may state that the admission of that evidence by the 
national court rendered the proceeding unfair, thereby infringing Art. 6 of the 
Convention”. 
The European Court has held that its role, according to Article 6(1) of the Convention 
is not to determine whether certain evidence has been obtained illegally but rather to 
consider whether such an “illegality” has the consequence of violating another right 
protected by the Convention. Thus, the Court must analyze the quality of the 
assessments made by national courts with regard to the defendants’ defense and 
ensure that they adequately guarantee the defendant’s right of defense, in particular 
the right to contradictory procedures and equality of arms (Bufinsky v. Romania, 
2004).  
Therefore, art. 6 par. (1) of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair trial, but it 
does not lay down any rule as to the admissibility of evidence or the manner in which 
it should be assessed, issues which are therefore primarily matters of national law 
and national courts. 
 
Message Transmission 
From the schematization of the definition of the communication, it appears that it 
comprises the source, namely the issuer, who, having a certain idea, pursuing an 
action from the recipient, that is the receiver, encodes it in a form accessible to his 
understanding. Coding is usually the letters and words of the language used by the 
issuer and receiver. The message can be expressed orally, in writing or non-verbal. 
The channel or media through which the message is transmitted and which links the 
two subjects when the communication is not direct can be a letter, a computer, 
telephone, fax, TV, etc. Selecting the right channel is essential for effective 
communication (Stoian, 2011). 
However, in order to correctly decode a message, we need to resort to a cumulus of 
factors, taking into account several aspects. 
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Thus, to interpret the meanings of a written message, we only have 7% of the 
information available. According to a study by Dr. Albert Mahrabian, the meaning 
of communication is given by words in the proportion of 7%, 38% voice and 
nonverbal behavior, 55%. 
The information resulted from interception of communications must be decoded with 
maximum responsibility of the judiciary body, because understanding the meaning 
of a message depends on several factors. 
In practice, the evidence obtained from interceptions are contested. In this case, the 
courts have to analyze very carefully because there is a risk of falsification or the risk 
of subjective interpretation of the message by the judicial bodies. 
We observe that the notion of communicating, as an essential element of human 
existence, is connected with the principles of freedom of expression and the right to 
respect the private and family life, domicile and correspondence, rights granted to 
any individual. 
 
Technical Surveillance in the Evidence System of the Criminal Trial 
The freedom of the judiciary in the administration of evidence must respect a certain 
balance between the need to protect the person's right to privacy and the fundamental 
principles of the criminal process, conditions in which the right to a fair trial is of 
paramount importance. 
In some cases against France (Kruslin & Huvig), the Court considered that the French 
system for authorization of wiretapping doesn’t give sufficient guarantees against 
abuses. This because in the law was no definition of the persons that can be 
intercepted. Also, the law didn’t say what are the crimes for which the interception 
can be authorized. 
Also, there were no limits on the length of the measure, if it was ordered by the 
training judge, there were no provisions on how to draft the minutes of the intercepted 
conversations and the measures to be taken to ensure that the recordings made either 
communicated intact and completely to the judge (who could not control the number 
and length of the original recorded bands) and to the defense, the ways in which the 
tapes could be destroyed (Bîrsan, 2005).  
The right guaranteed by art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights may be 
subject to certain limitations, being part of the category of conditional rights, thus 
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allowing, under the terms of paragraph 2 of this law, the interference of public 
authorities with the purpose of intercepting communications in order to obtain means 
of evidence. 
By interception of electronic communications or any other communications we 
understand to access, monitor, collect or record conversations by telephone, 
informatic systems or any other mean of communication. 
The access to an informatic system is hacking into a computer or storage device, 
directly or indirectly, with special programmes or by a network, in order to identify 
evidences.  
The video, audio or photo surveillance is taking pictures of persons, spying or 
recording conversations, movements or any other activity. This measure can apply 
to stakeout and to monitor ambient conversations.  
Localization and tracking by technical means the use of devices that determine the 
place where a person or an object is. 
It is necessary to distinguish between GPS surveillance relative to public travel and 
that performed by other visual or acoustic means, since the first one captures fewer 
elements related to the conduct, views or feelings of the person being traced, 
therefore the violations of the person’s right to privacy are less intense. The European 
Court therefore considered that in this case it is not necessary to apply the same strict 
safeguards which, according to its case law, should be observed in the case of 
telephone interceptions. For example, it is not necessary to strictly specify the 
maximum duration of the measure taken or the procedure for using and storing the 
data (Uzun v. Germany). 
Another technical surveillance method is obtaining data on a person's financial 
transactions. This measure means any operation that provides insight into the content 
of financial transactions and other transactions that were or are to be performed 
through a credit institution or other financial entity, as well as obtaining, from a credit 
institution or from another financial entity, documents or information in its 
possession relating to the transactions or operations of a person. 
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Requirements in the Matter of Electronic Surveillance in the Light of the 
European Court Jurisprudence 
Human rights are guaranteed by the European Convention, elaborated by the Council 
of Europe and signed in Rome at 04th of November 1950. 
It is appreciated in the literature (Udroiu & Predescu, 2008) that this regional 
international document has a two-dimensional, normative and institutional 
dimension, a legally binding instrument for States Parties, meaning that “it is not 
content to recognize individual rights, but raises them to a legal rank and, for the first 
time, internationally, gives them protection”. 
European Convention and the European Court`s jurisprudence do not require 
Contracting States to integrate rules in national laws or to apply them in the national 
legal system. 
In other member states of the European Council, we find a dualist system (non-
integrator system) according to which, the dispositions from the Convention are 
applicable only if they are found in special national laws, which recognizes the 
internal validity of conventional provisions (In this situation are: Finland, Malta, 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Great Britain). 
In countries such as Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium, 
there are monistic systems (integration systems), the European Convention being 
automatically incorporated into the domestic legal order by the effect of the national 
constitutional provisions (Udroiu & Predescu, 2008). 
Therefore, the freedom of the judicial bodies to administer evidences must respect a 
balance between the right to privacy and the fundamental principles of the criminal 
trial. 
Both the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union adopted by the Nice European Council on 7 December 2000, 
expressly enshrines the right to respect for private life, family, domicile and 
correspondence. Thus, the statement of absolute principal value guarantees the fact 
that no person will be subjected to arbitrary interference in his private life, in his 
family, at his home or in his correspondence, being guaranteed also the respect for 
his honor and reputation. 
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice comes in support of the above-
mentioned, under Art. 8. 
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The European Court ruled on the incidence of Art. 8 of the Convention in the cases 
in which the telephone calls were intercepted in Klass and others against the Federal 
Republic of Germany where it was argued that “the German Basic Law allows certain 
authorities to open and control postal correspondence and mailings, read the 
telephone messages, intercept and record phone conversations, measures that make 
no doubt the interference in private and family life. From this point of view, the Court 
held that these forms of communication, although not expressly mentioned in the text 
of the Convention, are inherent in the notion of private life”. 
 
Conditions Provided by the European Convention, Derived from the 
Practice of the Strasbourg Court in Order to Guarantee the Right 
Provided by Art. 8 
A first condition that needs to be met is that the interference in private life is provided 
by law. This involves not only respecting internal law, but also referring to the quality 
of the law, which must be compatible with the system of rule of law (Khan v. UK). 
From the “prescribed by law”, two more requirements arise, concerning accessibility 
and predictability of the law. From the point of view of the need for foreseeability of 
the law, the European Court found that the law on intercepts and recordings of 
communications and conversations must be of particular precision, and the existence 
of clear and detailed rules appears to be indispensable (Huvig v. France).  
A second condition provided by art. Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention is that 
the intervention of the authority must be necessary in a democratic society for the 
defense of a legitimate aim. “It is about protecting national security, preventing 
criminal offenses, and protecting the rights and interests of others. It is therefore 
considered that the existence of legislation permitting the interception of 
communications may be necessary for the defense of order and the prevention of 
crime, but the supervisory system adopted must be accompanied by sufficient 
safeguards against excesses” (Malone v. The United Kingdom). 
The last condition to be specified is a creation of the European Court's jurisprudence, 
leading to the formulation of a new principle in the matter - that of proportionality. 
Therefore, it implies respecting the proportionality between the interference, namely 
the measure of public authority and the legitimate purpose defended (Bogdan, 2006). 
Consequently, it is necessary to determine the existence of a pressing social need that 
imposed the interference with the right to private life.  
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Art. 8 par. Article 2 of the Convention permits the interference of the authorities in 
the exercise of the right to correspondence in a restrictive manner and in compliance 
with the principle of proportionality, that is to say, only if the interference is 
prescribed by law and constitutes a measure that is necessary in a democratic state 
for national security, the country's economic well-being, the defense of order and the 
prevention of criminal deeds, the protection of health or morals or the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. 
The making of secret interceptions should be authorized by national law, the use of 
secret listening devices in the absence of such authorization leading to the finding of 
violations of art. 8 of the Convention (Hewitson v. The UK) . 
The Court states that, in order to comply with par. 2 art. 8 para. 2 of the Convention, 
such an interference must be prescribed by law. The expression “prescribed by law” 
imposes not only the observance of domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the 
law (Khan v. The United Kingdom). In the context of secret oversight exercised by 
public authorities, domestic law must provide protection against arbitrary 
interference in the exercise of the right of a person protected by art. 8 (Raducu v. 
Romania). 
In another case, the court found the violation of art. 8 regarding police interception. 
Taking into account the fact that there are cases where people are consciously 
engaged in activities registered or publicly reported or likely to be, the expectation 
of a certain form of respect for privacy can play a significant role. Instead, privacy 
can come into play when there is a systematic or permanent recording of public 
domain items. The Court considered that obtaining samples of the applicants' 
complaints to be subjected to comparative analysis was the treatment of personal 
data, so that Art. 8 is applicable. The Court has held that the principle under which 
domestic law must protect against arbitrariness and abuse in the use of secret 
surveillance techniques also applies to devices installed in police premises. Taking 
into account that, at the time of the events, the British law did not contain any law 
permitting and regulating such cases, the Court found that the measure was not 
prescribed by law, so that art. 8 has been violated in this regard (PG, JH v. UK). 
In Vetter v. France, the Court examined whether the installation of microphones was 
a measure prescribed by law. Thus, it was considered that art. 100 of the French Code 
of Criminal Procedure was not applicable as it only concerns the recording of 
telephone conversations and art. 81 does not provide for any condition in which the 
magistrate may impose restrictive measures on the privacy of a person. Therefore, in 
the absence of a minimum level of protection provided by national law, the Court 
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considered that the interference in the applicant's privacy was not prescribed by law, 
and Art. 8 was violated. 
Another condition is that interference is necessary in a democratic state, but the 
Convention texts do not provide “the requirements of a society in order to be 
considered a democratic state, or whether in a society that does not fulfill the criteria 
to be considered to be democratic, the interference of the state authorities could be 
exercised without any limitations, being discretionary to take any measures” 
(Pivniceru & Moldovan, 2006). 
Therefore, the task of interpreting the provisions of Art. 8 par. 2 returned to the 
European Court of Human Rights, which stated that the text cited is intended to 
provide protection against arbitrary interference by the authorities, and consequently 
set up a series of safeguards. (Hakkanen v. Finland) 
The Court has only the possibility to analyze whether interference by state authorities 
is permitted under domestic law and whether it provides guarantees to the person 
against whom such measures have been ordered. 
Thus, in the case of making secret videos at the police station, for the purpose of 
identifying a suspect, the Court found that there is a basis in domestic law, but the 
way in which the records were made on a permanent basis in the purpose of their use 
in a trial was considered as a treatment or collection of personal data and therefore 
the European Court held that the interference of the authorities was not prescribed 
by law (Perry v. The United Kingdom) 
Regarding accessibility and predictability of the law, it is also necessary for the law 
to be accessible, as a matter of publicizing or informing the citizens of the normative 
texts, so that they may have the opportunity to consult them.  
Faced with the requirement of accessibility, the Court analyzed compliance with Art. 
8 in the case of the registration of a human rights activist in a database for secret 
surveillance and the keeping of such records, as well as his arrest in this context. The 
database containing the name of the plaintiff was created on the basis of a ministerial 
decision that was neither published nor disclosed to the public in any way. Citizens 
cannot know why a person is registered, for how long the information collected is 
preserved, what kind of information the database contains, how they are preserved 
and used, and by whom, in this respect violated art. 5 par. 1 and art. 8 (Shimovolos 
v. Russia). 
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Regarding the foreseeability of the law, the Court found in its case-law “violation of 
art. 8 of the Convention, noting that during the criminal investigations, the judge 
Elena Pop Blaga was illegally listened on the basis of interception warrants issued 
by the prosecutors, but also by the High Court of Cassation and Justice, between 
1999 and 2003, interceptions which continued in 2005”. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to mention the necessity of compatibility of the law with 
the prerogative of law, domestic law having to use clear terms to indicate to the public 
to a sufficient degree, under what circumstances and under what conditions is 
possible for the public authorities to take such secret measures. Thus, the absence of 
public control and the risk of abuse of power imply that domestic law must provide 
protection against interference in the rights guaranteed by art. 8. (Halford v. UK, 
Kopp v. Switzerland) 
As regards the preeminence of the law, in a recent case against the Netherlands (in 
the context of an open parliamentary inquiry into methods of investigation in the 
Netherlands due to a controversy over an inter-regional investigative cell in the North 
of the Netherlands (Utrecht)), the applicant, a police officer working for the criminal 
intelligence service, claims that part of the conversations he had with an informant 
were recorded with devices provided by the national police investigation department. 
As regards the violation of Article 8, the Court found that the applicant was deprived 
of the right to a minimum degree of protection required by the pre-eminence of the 
right in a democratic society, and also found it unacceptable that the authorities had 
provided technical assistance that were not the subject of rules to guarantee against 
arbitrary action (Van Vondel v. The Netherlands). 
In the literature (Pivniceru & Moldovan, 2006) it is appreciated that in the name of 
the protection of the democratic society there is the possibility of abuses, which can 
seriously affect the respect for the private life and correspondence of the person and 
the internal law allowing such interference by the public authorities must contain 
strict and clear rules in order to providing guarantees for persons subject to such 
measures.  
Therefore, it is necessary to provide for the categories of persons who can be heard, 
the nature of the offenses, the limit for the duration of the measure (Renucci, 2002), 
aspects regarding the drawing up of minutes recording the interceptions, the 
possibility of controlling these records by a judge or even by the defender, the 
circumstances in which their destruction may take place, etc. 
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Disclosure of Information from Files Resulting from Interception and 
Surveillance  
Regarding the fact that in the last few years we have been witnessing the media 
coverage of the recordings in important public cases, without any repercussions for 
the persons responsible for disclosing confidential information from ongoing 
investigations, the European Court has established in a recent case the infringement 
against Romania due to the violation of article 8 in terms of disclosure in the press 
of extracts from the transcripts of telephone conversations intercepted by the 
authorities. 
The Court examined whether the national authorities took the necessary measures to 
ensure the effective protection of that right by examining, first, whether the 
disclosure of the information had caused the applicant any damage and whether the 
measures taken by the authorities were appropriate (Casuneanu v. Romania) 
As regards the first aspect, the Court noted that extracts from the criminal prosecution 
file were made public before the indictment was issued. Regarding the “leak” of 
information by the authorities, the court considered it irrelevant that the criminal case 
in which the applicant was investigated was of particular public interest. 
In cases where confidential information has been given to the press, it is first and 
foremost for the Member States to organize their authorities and train their officials 
to ensure that no confidential or secret information is disclosed. As regards the 
consequences for the applicant of leaking information to the press, the Court 
emphasized that the applicant had no means at its disposal to protect his reputation 
because the allegations had not yet been substantively examined by a court and the 
authenticity or accuracy of the telephone conversations and their interpretation could 
not be challenged.  
As a consequence, the applicant suffered a prejudice by interference with his right at 
private life because of the transmission to the press of the extracts from the transcripts 
of the telephone conversations. By its nature, the interceptions procedure is subject 
to judicial review and it is logical that the result of this procedure should not be made 
public without careful judicial investigation. 
In another case (Craxi No. 2 v. Italy), the European Court recalls that, although the 
essential objective of Art. 8 is to protect individuals against arbitrary interference by 
public authorities, it is not limited to obliging the state to refrain from such 
interference. 
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The Court considers that appropriate safeguards should be available to prevent any 
such disclosure of a private nature which may be contrary to the safeguards of Art. 8 
of the Convention, and when such disclosure has taken place, the positive obligation 
inherent in effective respect for private life entails the obligation to conduct effective 
investigations to correct the problem as far as possible. 
It was established that private disclosures took place in violation of Art. 8 of the 
Convention, because the transcripts were submitted under the responsibility of the 
court secretary and the authorities didn’t provide safe custody in order to guarantee 
the applicant's right to private life. 
The European Court established that in Craxi no. 2, were no effective investigations 
in order to discover the circumstances in which journalists had access to the 
transcripts of conversations and to punish the persons responsible for the errors 
committed. 
In fact, as they did not initiate effective investigations on the issue in question, the 
Italian authorities could not fulfill their alternative obligation to provide a plausible 
explanation as to the way in which the complainant’s private communications were 
publicly disclosed. The Court therefore considers that the respondent State has failed 
to fulfill its obligation to guarantee the applicant’s right to respect for his private life 
and his correspondence. Consequently, Art. 8 of the Convention was violated. 
In another solution, the European Court found, with regard to the applicant's 
telephone conversation with JB, that it was not in compliance with the law, giving 
rise to a violation of Art. 8 of the Convention, relating to the disclosure of the 
applicant’s talks in October and November 2003 with his business partners and the 
Head of State. In view of the inappropriate language used by the applicant during 
these conversations, the Court attaches some weight to his sentiment that it might, to 
a certain extent, the disclosure discredited the name of the applicant in business 
circles and the general public (Draksas v. Lithuania). 
In essence, the court first referred to the principles governing the protection of the 
right to reputation by Article 8 of the Convention. As far as the principles are 
concerned, the framework in which they emerged is the Allenet de Ribemont 
judgment against France, the first case in which there was a violation of the 
presumption of innocence due to public statements by the officials. 
It was considered that “the presumption of innocence is a necessary element for the 
existence of a fair trial in the sense of Article 6 paragraph 1 and considers that this 
presumption will be violated whenever a judicial decision concerning a person 
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accused of committing a criminal act reflects the opinion of the existence of guilt 
before it is established according to the law. Moreover, it is sufficient to have some 
reasoning of the court indicating that the accused is guilty of defrauding the guilt of 
presumption of innocence. These violations may also exist in proceedings not 
directly concerned with the determination of guilt” (Lăncrăjan, 2009). 
It has been stressed that “public access to data contained in a criminal file is not 
unlimited but subject to rules that are applied by a judge, and at the request of the 
complainant access to the press may be limited. If there is no judicial control of public 
access to the file and the information is “leaked” to the press, what will be of 
importance will be firstly whether the Member State has organized its authorities and 
formed its officials to avoid the circumvention of the procedure and, secondly, 
whether the applicant has remedies in order to obtain redress for the violation of his 
rights” (Pettiti, 2009). 
 
Guarantees Provided by Other States’ Legislation on Interception and 
Recording of Conversations and Communications 
A comparative analysis of the laws of the Member States in the European Union 
reveals a consolidation of cooperation in the criminal domain. 
Significant contributions are made by applying the principle of mutual recognition 
of sentences, the European arrest warrant and the Framework Decision on enhanced 
cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organized cross-border crime 
(Himberg, 2008).  
Enshrining the right to a fair trial at international level has been achieved through 
important legal instruments guaranteeing human rights such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights1, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights2, the European Convention on Human Rights3, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union4, The American Declaration of Human Rights and 
                                                             
1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations through Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
2 Adopted and opened for signature by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 
1966. 
3 Signed in Rome on 4 November 1950. 
4 J.O.U.E. no. C326/393of 26th of october 2012. 
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Responsibilities1, the American Convention on Human Rights2, the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights3, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
Islam4 and the Arab Charter on Human Rights5. 
 
Issues Related to the Need for a Warrant or Interception Authorization 
The comparative study of supervisory practices shows that the use of audio-video 
recordings by judicial bodies is usually conditional upon the issuance of a warrant or 
authorization, subject to some form of hierarchical control, but there are also 
derogatory situations from this rule.  
Thus, electronic surveillance carried out in a public place will not always require a 
warrant, as there are forms of surveillance, such as video surveillance built into a 
vehicle, visual surveillance, the use of video operators by the officers and closed 
circuit video surveillance monitored by police, which have their own regulation, 
provided by codes of practice and procedural guides. 
At the same time, we find that if supervision is carried out in a situation where the 
subject enjoys the right to privacy, a warrant is required. These forms of surveillance 
include, for example, intercepting communications (via fixed telephones, mobile 
phones, voice over IP) and installing and monitoring tracking devices. Issuing an 
authorization prior to intercepting ensures the lawfulness of obtaining the evidence, 
a guarantee which may have implications for their admissibility. 
 
Recording Performed by One of the Parties 
Regarding the recordings made by a person that takes part of the conversation, we 
note that in some states, if a person agrees to record the conversation, this is a 
condition of admissibility in court, if the law does not provide for the use of this 
                                                             
1 The first international instrument adopted in the field of human rights, adopted in April 1948, at the 
9th Conference of the American States. 
2 Adopted in San Jose, Costa Rica on 22 November 1969 at the Inter-American Specialized Conference 
on Human Rights, organized under the aegis of the Organization of American States. 
3 Adopted in Nairobi on 27 June 1981, at the 18th Conference of the Heads of State and Government 
of the African Union Organization. 
4 Adopted in Cairo on 5 August 1990 by 45 Foreign Ministers of States of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference. 
5 Adopted by the League of Arab States in Tunis on May 22, 2004. 
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means of proof the need to obtain the consent of the other parties involved in 
discussions that do not know that the discussion is recorded.  
In the latter hypothesis, the court will not be able to listen to the conversation, making 
the entries inadmissible. Conversely, the content of the conversation will be based 
solely on the memory of the person being heard, without any guarantee as to what 
was said in that discussion. 
 
The Implications of the Breach of Legislation on Interception and Electronic 
Surveillance 
In legislation where authorization for the conduct of electronic surveillance is 
required, usually interception of communications or undercover surveillance without 
a warrant is considered an offense, especially when the subject has a reasonable 
expectation of intimacy. Thus, at first glance, the officer who performed such 
surveillance will be criminally liable. However, there are also a number of 
exceptions, including, for example, where there is a mandate or if the officer acts in 
good faith, considering that supervision has been authorized. 
The officer who carried out the unlawful supervision is very rarely held liable in most 
legal systems, with the most important sanction being the inadmissibility of evidence 
in criminal proceedings against the suspect. However, there are laws where evidence 
obtained illegally by electronic surveillance is not rendered inadmissible, and their 
admissibility will then be analyzed. 
In Denmark and Norway, the collection of electronic evidence is carried out under 
the supervision of the prosecutor. If the prosecutor uses electronic methods of 
collecting evidence without the necessary judicial authorization, the evidence thus 
obtained will not be inadmissible. Instead, this will be a factor that the judge will 
consider when analyzing the probative value of the information obtained. However, 
collecting electronic evidence illegally by a prosecutor is a very rare event. 
Moreover, if it is not the result of a justifiable error, it may lead to disciplinary action 
or criminal charges.  
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Conclusions 
In the context of the evolution of technology, the legislation of the EU member states 
is constantly adapting, and in order to ensure effective judicial cooperation, it seeks 
to harmonize laws as well as to regulate unambiguous provisions. 
Each law regulates differently the conditions that need to be met for the issue of a 
warrant to authorize the use of the electronic surveillance procedure. The applicant 
must generally demonstrate that the use of electronic surveillance is necessary either 
in the interests of national security or for the purpose of preventing or investigating 
offenses. 
Sometimes in order to be authorized to use of interception devices, the applicant must 
demonstrate that the offense in question is classified as a “serious crime” category 
which varies from state to state. 
Often, the legislation will explicitly indicate the factors that need to be considered 
for issuing an warrant. The basis for such a request will be that there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that a relevant offense has been, is or will be committed.  
Other factors that need to be examined are the probative value of the evidence to be 
obtained through electronic surveillance, the opportunity of alternative probative 
procedures and the condition that the warrant issued is in the interest of the 
administration of justice. 
While many laws do not expressly state what the oral or written evidence must be 
attested to, others are quite rigorous about this. In addition, the judge will be able 
(even if not expressly provided for in law) to request additional evidence. 
The scope of electronic surveillance warrants is limited, most national systems 
regulating electronic supervision provide expressly and in detail for information that 
a warrant should contain. These are usually substantially the same as those contained 
in the warrant application, a logical and necessary condition for law enforcement 
authorities to understand the scope of authorized legal supervision. Consequently, 
the duration, location and type of electronic surveillance will be specified in both the 
request and the warrant. 
Also, the warrant will typically authorize the installation and recovery of a 
surveillance device in or on a particular place or thing. Sometimes there is also a 
requirement that, when the circumstances justifying electronic surveillance (and thus 
the mandate issued) cease to exist, the supervisor will be obliged to stop the 
procedure. 
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In general, there are certain strategic principles or considerations limiting the use of 
electronic surveillance for obtaining evidence in serious crime investigations, such 
as necessity, subsidiarity, proportionality and judicial control. 
Thus, interference with privacy is allowed if obtaining electronic evidence is 
necessary to gather useful evidence or information and other less invasive forms of 
investigation or investigation are not sufficient. At the same time, the measure may 
be authorized when there are mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of 
information obtained, including the privacy of third parties not subject to 
authorization or warrant. 
It is also necessary that private life intrusion be proportionate to the seriousness of 
the suspected offense and to the evidence that it is expected to be obtained and, last 
but not least, that the process of collecting evidence is supervised by an independent 
judge or other hierarchical superior body with a certain degree of authority. 
The research we have carried out has highlighted positive and negative aspects, both 
at the theoretical and jurisprudential level, relative to the way audio and video 
intercepts and recordings are made. 
From a criminal-law point of view, the scale of the criminal phenomenon and the 
evolution of technology impose a continuous adaptation of normative regulations, 
which requires an analysis of the various laws that have achieved greater success in 
combating and preventing crime. 
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